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Introduction: political violence in the land of the
emperors
1 As any  country  in  the  world,  Japan in  the  course  of  its  history  experienced  many
phenomena  of  internal  wars,  on  different  scales  and  of  different  natures.  The
construction  of  fortified  villages  in  the  Yayoi  period,  the  political  struggles  of  the
Yamato  kingdom,  the  revolts  against  the  imperial  regime in  the  Heian  period,  the
battles between warrior clans in the 12th century or political anarchy in the 15th and
16th centuries are some examples1. Modern Japan experienced a major political change
with the coup initiated in 1868 by the Satsuma and Chōshū clans of southwest Japan
against  the  Tokugawa  shogunate.  The  victory  of  Satsuma  and  Chōshū  and  the
establishment  of  the  imperial  regime in  1889  meant  the  creation of  an ideology,  a
discourse  legitimising  the  imperial  regime  based  on  a  false  historical  fact  –the
supposedly unbroken line of divine emperors starting with the fictitious Jinmu2. The
creation of the imperial  regime meant also a general revision of the Japanese past,
starting  with  the  coup of  1868  itself.  During  all  its  existence,  the  management  of
Japanese history was a central problem for the regime. As was shown by Mitani Hiroshi,
in 1940 the imperial regime published a large compilation of sources entitled “History
of the restoration” (Ishinshi).  This work established a vision of the birth of  modern
Japan that became the classical  narrative to describe it,  even outside Japan. In this
narrative, the opening up of 1853 led to the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate by a
restorationist  movement  (the  “reverence  for  the  emperor  and  expulsion  of  the
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barbarians”  (sonnō  jōi)  movement).  The  victorious  restorationist  movement  started
radical reforms in the name of “opening to civilisation” (bunmei kaika) and “enrich the
country,  strengthen  the  army”  (fukoku  kyōhei)3.  This  narrative  gave  a  central  and
positive role to the oligarchs of Satsuma and Chōshū, and simultaneously helped draw a
linear discourse leading to the establishment of the imperial regime in 1889. In the year
the historian Tsuda Sōkichi published the History of the restoration, the regime put him
on trial for having criticised the myths establishing the imperial ideology. Tsuda was
expelled from the university, four of his books were banned, and two years later he was
sentenced to jail for three months4.
2 Ironically,  modern  historical  studies  were  born  at  the  same  time  as  the  imperial
regime: in 1887, Ludwig Reiss (1861-1928), a disciple of Leopold von Ranke, was invited
to Japan to introduce the new historiographical methods, and the year 1889 saw the
establishing of a National history department in the Tokyo Imperial University,  the
creation  of  the  Society  for  historical  studies  (Shigakkai)  and  of  a  related  academic
review (Shigaku zasshi). From this beginning until the fascist period, Japanese historians
had to  confront  the imperial  ideology:  before  Tsuda,  Kume Kunitake was forced to
resign in 1892 for asserting that Shinto myths were not historical facts. Of course, this
does not mean that historical studies were entirely under control5, but a red line did
exist.
3 The goal of the present article will be to complete previous researches by focusing on
the phenomenon of revolution in the use of history during the Meiji era (1868-1912). By
establishing an unbroken line of divine sovereigns, the imperial ideology proposed a
vision of Japanese history allowing no place to revolution. That is why the 1868 coup
was considered as a “restoration” (ishin).  We shall discuss here the use of the word
“revolution” (kakumei)6 to show that revolution was the central problem in the writing
of history because the interest for revolution itself was often linked with a political
agenda, or at least a will to challenge the official ideology. That is why the discourse on
historians often came from non-professional historians who used the free space left by
the belated creation of professional historical studies. The political agenda was on one
side state-sponsored history promoting the imperial regime, and on the other side pro-
revolution democratic views coming from the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement
(Jiyū minken ndo) between 1874 and 1890, and after 1890 from the modern nationalists of
the Min’yūsha (“Society of the People’s Friends”). The latter challenged the former on
every single issue that had to do with the importance of revolution.
4 This  article  will  explore  three  aspects  of  Japanese  and  European  histories  where
kakumei have been discussed vis-à-vis the imperial ideology. The first part will outline
the definition of Meiji restoration in the context of the creation of the new regime. The
two other parts will discuss the aspects challenging the official view of history. The
second part details the historical events which put into question the legitimacy of the
actual imperial family, that is to say, the coup led by the (real) first emperor Tenmu
against his nephew Ōtomo in 672, and the war between the two imperial courts from
1334 to 1392. The third and last part will discuss the role of revolution in European
history, especially the French revolution, to show that a counter narrative existed in
Meiji  Japan,  highlighting  revolution  as  a  model  to  establish  democracy  against  the
empire centered project of the government.
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I. The controversy on the civil war of 1868
I.a. The ideological use of the 1868 civil war and history
5 The first event to appear as revolution in the debate on history in the Meiji era was the
event that directly gave birth to modern Japan, the civil war of 1868-1869 (Boshin war).
It is remarkable that the authors of this military seizure of power gave a central role to
history. One of the reasons of such importance given to history was that the gigantic
work (397 volumes) sponsored by the Mito clan, the History of Great Japan (Dai Nihonshi,
started in the mid-17th century and still  unfinished in 1868) which emerged in the
wave of  the  kokugaku (“Studies  of  the country”),  contributed to  the  anti-Tokugawa
discourse.  Even  before  the  radical  transformations  for  which  the  new  Meiji
government, the Dajōkan, became famous, the very first initiative was to provide an
official interpretation of the recent events and to describe the coup not as a revolution
but  as  a  restoration  (the  so-called  “Meiji  restoration”,  Meiji  ishin),  more  precisely
a“restoration of imperial power” (ōsei fukko). On May 3rd 1869, the emperor made a
declaration calling for the establishment of an official history in continuity with the six
historical  chronicles  (Rikkokushi)7 written  on  imperial  order,  namely,  the  Kojiki,  the
Nihon  shoki and  the  four  other  chronicles  compiled  until  901 8.  The  government
established  the  Compilation  of  History  Bureau  (Shūshikyoku)  just  after  the  imperial
declaration of 1869, reemploying the scholars specialised in the tradition of Chinese
historiography as well as the kokugaku. This Bureau was one of the seiin which was the
highest organ of the Dajōkan, the Meiji government9. As for the civil war, in June 1872,
the  new  government  ordered the  compilation  of  all  sources  related  to  the  recent
events, under its direct control. Due to many troubles, this work went on for 17 years
resulting in two books entitled “Chronicle of the restoration” (Fukkoki) and “External
Chronicle of the restoration” (Fukkoki gaiki,  dedicated specifically to the battles)10.  A
shorter version was published under the title Meiji shiyō from 1876 to 1885. The Fukkoki
and Fukko gaiki were published by the Compilation of History Bureau whose scholars
were  also  put  to  task  to  establish  an official  history  giving  priority  to  the  sources
related to the ancient emperors. The Rikkokushi were republished in the 1870s and the
compilation of the Dai Nihonshi was completed in 1906. A Chronological History of Great
Japan (Dai Nihon hennenshi) was also planned as an official history to complement the
Rikkokushi and Dai Nihonshi. A selective compilation of sources gave birth to the first
histories  by  professional  historians  prefiguring  the  vision  of  1940.  In  the  work  of
Shigeno Yasutsugu, the word kakumei (revolution) was completely absent11.
6 This  active  promotion  of  an  official  version  of  the  civil  war  came  along  with  the
establishment of symbols that became later important institutions of the new imperial
regime: in 1869, a Shintō sanctuary, the Shōkonsha, was created in Tōkyō in memory of
the warriors killed during the Boshin war, and was later to be renamed the Yasukuni
shrine.
 
I.b. Challenging the state-sponsored history: the earliest
professional historians and the democrats
7 The elaboration of this Satsuma-Chōshū centered view of the civil war was challenged
very soon, first by the vanquished and later by the democrats. Fukkoki and Fukko gaiki
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were enormous compilations, yet they did not include documents related to characters
on the defeated side. This is why warrior families close to the Tokugawa shogun, such
as the Echizen clan, started to compile their own history of the events, long before the
Boshin war12. During the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, some men close to
this democratic movement tried to challenge the official interpretation of the Boshin
war. In 1888, the politician and journalist Shimada Saburō published Background to the
opening of the country (Kaikoku shimatsu), in which he presented a positive biography of Ii
Naosuke, a shogunate official who had repressed the pro-restoration warriors. The year
before,  the  journalist  Noguchi  Katsuichi  had  launched the  publication  of  Unofficial
Sources of the Restoration (Yashidai ishin shiryō, 1887-1896). In the 1890s some journalists,
partly  from  the  Min’yūsha  circle,  published  their  own  histories  of  the  civil  war:
Takekoshi  Yosaburō’s  History  of  the  New  Japan ( Shin  Nihon  shi 1890-91),  Fukuchi
Gen.ichirō’s On the Decline of the Shogunate (Bakumatsu suibōron, 1892) and Politicians of the
End of the Shogunate (Bakumatsu seijika, 1898), and Tokutomi Sohō’s Yoshida Shōin (1893).
The common point of these writings was to strive towards a more objective history of
the civil war by moving away from the Chōshū-Satsuma centered vision of the official
history13. Thus, Tokutomi had no qualms about presenting Yoshida Shōin, the master of
the Meiji  government leaders,  as  a  revolutionary (kakumeika)14.  Similarly,  Takekoshi
Yosaburō also described the civil war as a revolution. In fact, Takekoshi based his work
on a distinction between three types of revolution: the restorationist revolution (fukko
teki  kakumei),  the  idealistic  revolution  (risō  tankyū  teki  kakumei),  and  the  anarchist
revolution  (ransei/anarkikaru15teki  kakumei).  Takekoshi  defined  the  restorationist
revolution as a revolution claiming freedom which existed in the past, like the English
revolution  which  took  the  Magna  Carta  as  a  model.  His  definition  had  therefore
nothing to do with the prevailing interpretation of “restoration”. According to him, the
French and American Revolutions were the models of the idealistic revolutions in the
sense  that  they  sought  freedom  for  the  future.  In  his  mind,  the  overthrow of  the
Tokugawa shogunate in 1868 was clearly an anarchist revolution because there was
neither a retrospect as a restorationist revolution would imply, nor a quest for an ideal
as claimed in the idealistic revolution16. Such a position was clearly a declaration of war
against the government-sponsored history. A similar point of view can be found in the
writings of Okada Rei’un (1870-1912), a journalist and thinker who was close to Kōtoku
Shūsui  and,  like  Kōtoku,  had  close  contacts  with  the  Chinese  Republicans.  Okada
wanted to start a second revolution to overthrow the Meiji oligarchs. In 1909, he wrote
one  of  the  first  histories  of  the  Freedom and  People’s  Rights  Movement  which  he
depicted as a revolution. To him, the Meiji restoration was a revolution like the Taika
reform of 645. In both cases, revolution occurred by contact with foreign cultures. In
645, Japan adopted the Chinese and Indian cultures and became part of Asia. In 1868,
Japan adopted Western culture based on liberty and equality, and became part of the
world.  Consequently  Okada  considered  the  Meiji  restoration  as  a  movement  of  the
people/nation,  not  different  from  the  case  of  Italy  and  Germany.  He  saw  no
contradiction  in  the  fact  that  Meiji  was  an  imperial  restoration  since  for  him  the
Japanese emperor was not separate from his people, being the chief of the Japanese
family. Okada thus shared a similar view with the official ideology. The main problem
lay with the real governors of Japan, the Tokugawa shogunate and the subsequent Meiji
government against whom the people stood up in revolution, as did the Westerners
against their sovereigns17. For Okada, the real Meiji restoration was not the civil war of
Japan, a country without revolution? Uses of kakumei and historical debates i...
Historians of Asia on Political Violence
4
1868  led  by  the  leaders  of  the  government,  but  the  Freedom  and  People’s  Rights
Movement.
8 With the death of the last shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu in 1913 and the new wave of
liberalism, fresh publications by non academic historians challenged the official view of
Meiji  restoration  by  paying  attention  to  the  historical  sources  from  the  Tokugawa
side18.
 
II. Revolution in imperial history: the murder of King
Ōtomo (672) by the first emperor Tenmu and the two
courts war (1337-1392).
II.a. The troubled creation of the imperial regime in 672
9 It is often said that the Japanese imperial dynasty is the longest living dynasty in the
world, starting with emperor Jinmu in 660 BC. This is not true since Jinmu and the
subsequent emperors never existed. It is an invention of the Meiji government, based
on  the  ideology  of  the  first  emperors  themselves.  Tenmu  established  the  imperial
regime in 672 AD by killing his nephew Ōtomo and annihilating the kingdom of Yamato.
Tenmu, together with his wife and successor Jitō, created a new regime inspired by the
Chinese model, chose Nihon as the name of the country and ordered the compilation of
the  Kojiki and Nihon  shoki following the  pattern of  the  Chinese  chronicles,  so  as  to
redefine the past for the benefit of the regime. Before Tenmu, the kings of Yamato
seem to have reigned according to the principle of primus inter pares, surrounded by
powerful families. In order to get a strong position in the young centralised state, the
emperors  altered  the  old  myths  so  that  they  could  be  the  only  humans  of  divine
ancestry hailing from the Sun goddess Amaterasu. What connected them to Jinmu19
now brought  them and all  the  kings  of  Yamato  under  a  single  dynasty,  regardless
whether the kingdom of Yamato had been ruled by one or several dynasties20. This was
also done to conceal the fact that the first emperor Tenmu (672-686) came to power by
rebelling and murdering his nephew Ōtomo. The reign of Ōtomo seems to have been
short (only nine months) and Tenmu challenged the decision of his brother king Tenchi
who chose his son instead of him. Both the Kojiki and the Nihon shoki make no mention
of Ōtomo, transforming what is now called the “turmoil of the year jinshin” (jinshin no
ran)21 into a taboo from the very start. The taboo turned out to be short-lived as well as
the imperial  power itself,  since alternative histories  in the Nara and Heian periods
claimed that prince Ōtomo did reign. In the Edo period, the Mito school, which was the
first to write a history of the country (Dai Nihonshi), chose to incorporate Ōtomo in the
list of the emperors starting with Jinmu. It is interesting to note that just after starting
the process to create a history of the 1868 civil  war,  the Meiji  government in 1870
ordered to officialise the history as devised by the Mito school and to make Ōtomo
emperor under the name of Kōbun. Such a decision was supposed to end the taboo
surrounding the story of Ōtomo.
10 But historians and democrats did not necessarily comply with this decision, at least
during the Meiji period. Following the new methods of historical studies established in
universities,  Hirade Kōjirō  of  the  Tokyo Imperial  University  conducted research on
Ōtomo in 1897 with an article in the review Shigaku zasshi where he questioned the
legitimacy  of  Ōtomo  as  emperor.  More  exactly,  he  analysed  the  historical  process
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through  which  the  Mito  school  decided  to  present  Ōtomo  as  emperor,  taking  into
account  historical  sources  after  the  Nihon  shoki,  which also  presented Ōtomo as  an
emperor22. Kita Sadakichi, later known for the controversy on the two imperial courts,
also produced a study on king Ōtomo. He suggested in 1904 that there did exist an
emperor, but it was a girl23. These studies directly challenged the official decision of
1870, but none of the historians have been sanctioned like Kume Kunitake for having
said that Shintō legends are fictions.
11 A year earlier, the journalist and liberal activist Takekoshi Yosaburō wrote a general
book of  national  history.  He  started  with  Jinmu but  described the  jinshin war  as  a
‘conservative reaction’. To him, ethically speaking, it was the war of an uncle against
his nephew; politically speaking, it was a conservative reaction but with progressive
results24. Takekoshi and Hirade were among the very few historians to pay attention to
the jinshin war during the Meiji era. Perhaps this was because the debate soon shifted to
the war between the two imperial courts in the 14th century.
 
II.b. The taboo of the two courts war in modern Japan
12 The medieval history of Japan has been particularly traumatic for the emperors: with
the  establishment  of  bakufu (warrior  government)  from 1185  to  1192,  they  lost  all
power and gradually fell into great poverty. The attempt of Emperor Godaigo to restore
imperial regime in 1333 was completely unrealistic and the warrior Ashikaga Takauji
manipulated the emperor to seize power from the Hōjō family. Takauji even supported
another branch of the imperial family to secure legitimacy and from 1336 till 1392 two
imperial courts coexisted in Japan. The victory of the Northern Dynasty, supported by
Ashikaga, meant the victory of the illegitimate lineage. The emperors of present Japan
come from the same line of ancestors. This is why the Dai Nihonshi as early as the Edo
period claimed the legitimacy of the Southern lineage.
13 After  the  1869  imperial  declaration,  the  Meiji  government  also  included this  event
quite early in its commemoration strategy. In the same year, the government created
new Shintō shrines in honour of the warriors who fought for the Southern court such
as Kamakuragū in the city of Kamakura (the ancient capital of the first warrior family
who came in power). In 1877, the official line of emperors saw the Southern emperors
replace the Northern emperors, as in the Dai Nihon shi. In Taisei kiyō, published by some
leaders of the Meiji government in 1883, the Northern emperors received the rank of tei
(the very same word used for the Chinese emperor)  and were no longer tennō  (the
Japanese word for “emperor”,  reserved only for the Japanese sovereign).  In 1900,  a
statue of Kusunoki Masashige, the most famous warrior who fought for the Southern
court, was erected in front of the imperial palace25.
14 This attempt by the state to establish an official view of Japanese history was soon to be
challenged, both within and without. The outside attack came as early as 1909 from the
journalist and politician Yamaji Aizan. Yamaji defended the criticism of Yoshino and
Kume26,  and took an opposite  position to  the negative portrait  of  Ashikaga Takauji
inherited from the Mito school.  He presented Ashikaga as a hero of warriors,  more
precisely as the leader of a conservative faction (hoshutō) who opposed the revolution
led by emperor Godaigo27. As to the inside attacks, they came from the first professional
historians. The Compilation of History Bureau was soon divided into scholars still loyal
to Chinese historiography and those more interested in source criticism. Among the
Japan, a country without revolution? Uses of kakumei and historical debates i...
Historians of Asia on Political Violence
6
latter was Shigeno Yasutsugu (1827-1910)28. He was educated in Confucian orthodoxy
and was responsible for the historical chronicles of the Shimazu clan, namely, Satsuma.
When his clan won the civil war in 1868 against the Tokugawa shogun, Shigeno worked
for  the  Compilation  of  History  Bureau  and  became  the  most  prominent  modern
historian. Before the arrival of Ludwig Reiss, it was probably with Shigeno’s support
that the Compilation of History Bureau invited in 1879 an exiled Hungarian diplomat, a
self-made historian at the University of London, George Zerffi (1820-1892), to write a
history of European historiography. His book, The Science of History (771 pages), despite
not being translated into Japanese,  contributed largely to transform the method of
Shigeno and his counterparts29. Shigeno with Kume Kunitake and Hoshino Hisashi were
transferred from the Shūshikyoku and made the first professors of history at the Tokyo
Imperial  University in 1888.  They thus became colleagues of  Reiss.  Shigeno worked
closely with him to create modern historical  studies  and was the first  president of
Shigakkai.
15 Despite his  support for the Satsuma-Chōshū  centered view of  the Meiji  restoration,
Shigeno Yasutsugu challenged the government over the two courts period. In 1890, he
claimed that there was no historical evidence for the existence of Kojima Takanori who
was celebrated as an imperial hero by the government (on the basis of the medieval
Taiheiki, “Chronicle of Grand Pacification”) and even upgraded as a deity. In the same
year, Kume Kunitake even questioned the historical veracity of Taiheiki as a whole30.
16 In 1911 the historian Kita Sadakichi (1871-1939) provoked a larger debate on the events.
Unlike  Yamaji  Aizan,  Kita  was  not  specifically  opposed  to  the  government.  After
graduating  in  history  in  1909  at  the  Tokyo  Imperial  University,  he  contributed  to
legitimise the annexation of Korea and supported the theory of common ancestries
between Koreans and Japanese (Nissen dōsoron)31. In 1910, he was appointed as editor of
history textbooks by the government. He gave lectures on the Two courts period to
teachers and claimed that it was impossible to decide which line was legitimate. On
January 19th 1911, Prime Minister Katsura Tarō attacked historians on this matter in
the newspaper Yomiuri shinbun. A great debate in the Parliament ensued (Nanbokuchō
seijun mondai) which resulted in Kita’s discharge from office. The same government also
planned the repression of the first Japanese socialists and anarchists. Kōtoku Shūsui
and others were accused of plotting the murder of the emperor and were executed on
January 24th the same year32.
17 The impact of this debate and the trial of the Japanese anarchists lasted until the end of
the imperial regime. Inoue Tetsujirō, the principal ideologue of the imperial regime,
writes in his Outlines of National Morals (1912) that history should focus only on morals
in order to maintain national unity. He saw the controversy of Ashikaga as a plot of
“anarchists”33.  A  historian  such  as  Tanaka  Yoshinari  cautiously  claimed  that  the
question of legitimacy between the two courts was to be avoided in academic research,
but  Ashikaga  Takauji  was  depicted  positively  in  Nanbokuchō  jidaishi (History  of  the
Northern and Southern courts  period)34.  With the  rise  of  fascism,  Ashikaga Takauji
again became a subject  of  debate.  In 1934,  the Minister  of  Commerce and Industry
Nakajima Kumakichi was forced to resign under the pressure of fascist organisations
who made use of his 1921 writings about Ashikaga Takauji arguing that Takauji’s case
should be re-examined35. This episode turned out to be one of the causes of the call for
a  “clarification  of  the  national  essence”  (kokutai  meichō  undō)  in  1935,  which
Japan, a country without revolution? Uses of kakumei and historical debates i...
Historians of Asia on Political Violence
7
contributed  to  the  rise  of  the  wartime  system  dominated  by  the  military  and  by
fascism.
 
III. Revolution and harmony as matters of Japanese
national identity
III.a. Revolution as model? Civilian historiography and the French
revolution
18 Since the Meiji era was a period of discovery of the past and recent history of the world,
revolution as a historical phenomenon was obviously not limited to Japanese history.
The Freedom and People’s Rights Movement, which began in 1874 with the demand for
a constitution and a parliament and saw the birth of political parties, also meant the
discovery of European political philosophy and history, including the revolutions. The
French  revolution  was  especially  attractive.  Among  the  writings  published  by  the
partisans  of  the  Movement,  there  is  an  astonishing  wealth  of  translations  and
presentations of revolutions, primarily the French revolution36. These documents can
be divided into two groups: (i) the publications by Nakae Chōmin (1847-1901), one of
the main intellectual figures of the Movement who translated Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s
On social contract and many French republican texts (ii) other publications.
19 The translations published by Nakae Chōmin and his disciples clearly show a will to
promote not only Rousseau but more generally the French revolution:
Official texts:
– The 1776 American Declaration of independence.
– The declaration of 22 May 1790 (Declaration of peace to the world).
– The Montagnard Constitution of 1793.
Political and literary texts:
– Harny De Guerville, La liberté conquise, ou le despotisme renversé37.
– La Marseillaise.
– Mirabeau, Essay on despotism.
Philosophical and law texts:
– Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments.
– Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Spirit (last chapter:
“On the future progress of the Human Spirit”).
Historical chronicles:
– Philippe Buchez, A Parliamentary History of the French Revolution.
– Victor  Duruy,  History  of  France.  Chōmin  referred  to  it  to  write  History  of  the  two
centuries before the French Revolution.
– Madame Ernest Duvergier de Hauranne, Popular History of the Revolution. Chōmin used
it to introduce the 1789 Cahiers de doléances.
– Amédée  Le  Faure,  Socialism  during  the  French  Revolution.  Chōmin  consulted  it  to
translate the Manifesto of the Equals.
20 The list shows how the Japanese saw a model in the French (as well as the American)
revolutions and how their own Movement could be a new revolution. It goes without
saying that kakumei had a positive meaning during the period among the followers of
the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement.
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21 Chōmin and his  disciples  were  among the  few Japanese  able  to  translate  from the
French.  Nevertheless,  other  minkenka people  translated French works  from English.
This  proves  to  what  degree  the  Freedom  and People’s  Rights  Movement  gave
importance to the French Revolution and wanted to associate their own movement
with kakumei. Most of the translations, such as those of Chōmin, were published around
the year 1882, the climax of the Movement and of the revolts against the government:
a) Translations:
François Mignet, Kawatsu Sukeyuki trans., Futsukoku kakumeishi (History of the French
Revolution, 1824, 1878 and 1889).
Adolphe Thiers,  Kusama Jifuku trans.,  Futsukoku kakumei  zenshi (Histoire des années
précédant la Révolution française [Histoire de la Révolution française, 1823-27]), 1884.
Unknown author, Watanabe Sōhō trans, Bankoku kakumei shi (History of the revolutions
throughout the world), 1890.
b) Single works (often based on European books):
Suzuki Gorō ed., Futsukoku kakumei genrinron (On the causes of the French revolution),
1882. Nariai Hisao, Ōbei minken shiryaku (Short history of the rights of the people in
Europe and the United States), 1882.
Ida Saneyuki, Seiyō  ensetsu kihan: minken to jiyū (Models of discourse in the West: the
rights of the people and freedom), 1882.
Hisamatsu Yoshinori, Taisai kakumei shikan. Furansu kakumei no bu (General History of
the Revolutions in the West. The French Revolution), 1882.
Takagi  Shūho  ed.,  Tsūzoku  Futsukoku  kakumeishi (Popular  history  of  the  French
revolution), 1887.
22 These texts often introduced the English and French revolutions as revolutions for the
“rights of the people” (minken), suggesting similarity with their own movement38.
23 This appeal of the French Revolution was so strong that the Meiji government, seeking
inspiration from Germany to establish an authoritarian constitution, felt  obliged to
publish translations against Rousseau and propounded a negative view of the French
revolution based mainly on German works39.
 
III.b. Japanese harmony versus Chinese revolution
24 The repression of the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement and the establishment of
the imperial regime had as corollary the negation of revolution: the proof of the divine
status of the imperial regime was found in history itself, in the absence of revolution,
which made possible a single and unbroken lineage. Revolution was therefore eluded in
Japanese history and in its stead the main value proclaimed was harmony (wa).
25 Some intellectuals were precursors in integrating the idea of harmony as the core of
Japanese,  or  more  largely,  Asian  identity.  The  art  critic  Okakura  Kakuzō  (Tenshin)
wrote  in  1903  The  Ideals  of  the  East  with  Special  Reference  to  the  Art  of  Japan  (later
translated into Japanese). Okakura presented a history of Asia in which he included
India, China and Japan. He characterised the Asiatic nature by gentleness, moral ethics,
harmony, beauty and communalism. Harmony was of primary importance in Okakura’s
way of thinking because in it lay the reason why Japan was in possession of the best of
Asia, since the Japanese spirit had the ability of assimilating from abroad what was
harmonious with its own nature.
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26 Okakura’s discourse contributed to the rise of harmony as a key concept of Japanese
and Chinese national  identities.  Two other factors played an important role in this
change. First,  studies on Chinese history developed in the academic world with the
establishment of “Oriental history studies” (Tōyō shigaku). In 1904, the first department
of Chinese history studies was created in the Faculty of letters at the Tokyo Imperial
University.  This  department  was  reformed  in  1910  as  the  Oriental  history  studies
department while the Historical studies department was divided the same year into
National history and Western history.
27 The second factor happened a year later: the 1911 Revolution in China provoked a huge
shock in Japan because it destroyed a multi-secular regime and the elites also feared
that the same could happen in Japan since Marxism and anarchism attracted more and
more Japanese. In fact, in the same year, Kōtoku Shūsui, the disciple of Nakae Chōmin
and founder of the first Socialist party, was executed by the government.
28 Such  characterisation,  however,  was  far  from  commonly  shared.  Naitō  Konan  for
example, in his book On China (Shinaron, 1914), refused to see any possibility of China as
a  potential  democracy  and  republic40.  Far  from  seeing  revolution  as  the  national
essence of China, Naitō considered that the 1911 Revolution was the product of contacts
with  the  West through  the  Chinese  students  sent  there.  On  the  other  hand,  Naitō
admitted a strong egalitarianism in Chinese society, an element that gave rise to the
Taiping rebellion41.  As  was  shown by Matsumoto Sannosuke,  Shiratori  Kurakichi  or
Yano Jin’ichi also considered republicanism as a novelty for China42.
 
Epilogue: after Meiji, the growing tension between
revolution and harmony
29 Between the 1920s and 1940s the characterisation of China and Europe by revolution
and of Japan by harmony became such a topos that it is impossible to synthesise here all
the texts involved during this period. The earliest examples of the characterisation of
China  as  revolutionary  can  be  found  in  the  1910s,  just  after  the  1911  Revolution,
regardless  of  the  political  camps.  The  liberal  Kayahara  Kazan interpreted  the  1911
Revolution  as  a  new form of  the  Chinese  republicanism (kyōwashugi)  which  can  be
found in the Chinese classics43. Kayahara referred on this point explicitly to Shiratori
Kurakichi44.
30 The success of the Soviet revolution added fear for the future of the imperial regime.
The tendency to characterise China as a  land of  revolution increased alongside the
characterisation  of  Japan  as  a  land  of  harmony.  For  example,  Yasuoka  Masahiro
(1898-1983) used his own interpretation of the word kakumei to characterise China and
the West  as  lands of  revolution,  contrasting them with Japan as  a  land of  political
stability45.  Hiraizumi Kiyoshi (1895-1984),  professor of history at the Tokyo Imperial
University,  provides another interesting example.  After a trip he made in the early
1930s to England, France and Germany conducting research on the French Revolution,
he published a book in which he compared European and Chinese revolutions with the
Japanese  Meiji  restoration46.  Hiraizumi  made  a  distinction  between  revolution  and
restoration, defining the former as the destruction of a state aimed at the creation of a
new  one47.  To  him,  the  best  illustration  according  to  this  definition  was  China.
Hiraizumi  even considered that  the  English  revolution of  1688  did  not  fit  with  his
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criteria  because it  was not  a  radical  change of  state48.  On the contrary,  the French
revolution  could  be  compared  to  the  Chinese  ekisei  kakumei because  it  “completely
destroyed the organisation of the state, ignoring its history and traditions” to create a
new  state49.  Such  an  interpretation  was  negative  because  Hiraizumi  interpreted
revolution in general as a “fit of madness” (hakkyō). He explicitly quoted Paul Bourget,
a  French  conservative  historian  and  member  of  the  Académie  française,  and  his
negative view of the French revolution: it had destroyed the feudal organisation that
was foundational of France to replace it with a centralised government which cut off
the French from their past50. Hiraizumi also quoted Edmund Burke, writing pages after
pages to persuade the reader that the Meiji restoration was not a revolution, despite all
appearances: it was a great change, or a reform, but not a revolution because it did not
cut  off  people  from  their  past.  Quite  to the  contrary,  the  Meiji  restoration  had
reestablished the “correct form of Japan, its natural form” (Nihonkoku no tadashii sugata,
honnen no sugata)51.
31 Needless to say, such discourse on China and revolution was not homogeneous. Pan-
Asianists and Marxists were willingly prepared to see revolution in Japan because they
wanted to accomplish a new revolution each for their own reasons. On the right, Ōkawa
Shūmei described the Meiji restoration as a revolution and saw it as a model for the
Shōwa restoration52. The same can be said about Kita Ikki, who even went to China to
witness the Chinese revolution with his own eyes53. On the left, Marxist historians such
as Hattori Shisō or Wani Gorō analysed the Meiji restoration as a bourgeois revolution54.
32 Due to the political crisis in the 1930s, the efforts of the government to define Japanese
identity  as  harmony,  loyalty  and  cohesiveness  culminated.  Starting  with  the
propaganda of the “Harmony of the five races” (gozoku kyōwa) to justify the creation of
the  Manchurian  State,  the  government  published  in  1937  the  True  Meaning  of  the
National  Essence ( Kokutai  no  hongi)  in  which  harmony  (wa)  was  for  the  first  time
highlighted as part of national identity55. Right-wing commentators of the text relayed
the  message56.  The  post-war  conservative  emphasis  on  harmony  cannot  been
understood  without  this  tension  and  debate  in  the  Meiji  era  about  history  and
revolution.
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